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NOTE
MUSEUM EXHIBITS OR ILL-GOTTEN GAINS:
A LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL LOOK AT
CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW
Anthony Elvis Gambino*
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The foundation of cultural property laws was laid at the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict. The convention, which usually revolved around the discussions on
former laws of warfare, had to switch gears to respond to the Nazi’s new
tactic of intentionally stealing or destroying cultural property as a means to
demoralize the enemy. The convention’s focus was inclusivity, which defined
cultural property as any “movable or immovable property of great
importance to the cultural heritage of every people.” However, that overly
simplistic definition that intended to serve as a source of clarification, has
been the catalyst of confusion and controversy in regard to who has custody
of artifacts -- which many could claim are owned by all of humanity. Various
alternate ideologies have emerged in trying to make sense of the ambiguity
of who owns cultural property? In addition, a multitude of international
efforts have formulated treaties that stem from Nazi Germany’s desire to
accumulate wealth and to psychologically dominate and disable the
Indigenous people’s culture through the seizure of famous works of art.
What will follow is a discussion on the impact of how cultural repatriation
laws, established during the post-Nazi occupation of Europe, encouraged the
discovery and return of looted art during Nazi occupation as well as the
reopening of cases that are hundreds of years old. However, while noble in
nature, many of these laws formed to initially protect artifacts are being used
to justify not returning artifacts to their homeland. Some argue "the notion
that identity, whether individual or group, must forever remain attached to a
particular object is unsettling.” A contemporary case where this idea was
tested played out in the courts of the United Kingdom. Here, the UK rejected
India's most recent demand to return its priceless artifacts like the "Kohinoor
Diamond" and "Sultanganj Buddha" that were stolen, looted, and/or
smuggled into England during British colonial rule.
* B.A. Candidate for Digital Technology & Emerging Media (major), Arabic (minor), and
Marketing (minor), Fordham College at Rose Hill, Class of 2021. Under the invaluable
guidance of the Fordham Undergraduate Law Review especially Jennifer Rivero (CoManaging Editor), Thomas Reuter (Senior Editor), and Tyler Raciti (Editor-in-Chief) who
pushed me to take a more critical and appreciative look at the museum world while writing
this piece. I would also like to acknowledge the Fordham Museum of Greek, Roman, and
Etruscan Art whose preservation and diligent approach to researching the provenance of
antiquities is inspiring.
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The British government is citing a law (British Museum Act 1963) that
“justifies” the reasons for not returning the pieces. Other arguments employ
a simpler ideology of whoever owned it originally, still owns it regardless of
present circumstances. By using Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Mill’s
ethical theory of Utilitarianism this Note will explore the benefits as well as
the dangerous implications set within these cases and philosophical
doctrines. Leading to the conclusion, that the idea of a ‘universal museum,
for all its Enlightenment virtues and educational potential, is still at its core
a problematic imperialist perspective. What is needed is the creation of a
third impartial council skilled in repatriation law that works in conjunction
with museums, indigenous tribes, nations, and the court to ensure a more just
and cosmopolitan future of museums.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For years museums throughout the world, primarily in the West, have been
dealing with some serious ethical issues in regard to the repatriation of
cultural property. Two of the most hotly contested points are: Is it logical to
repatriate historical objects to countries that cannot provide the same standard
of care as a (Western) museum? Further, is it ethical for museums to acquire
work from a country who is now in possession of artwork that was acquired
through pillaging during war time? Although much of this “art grab” occurred
during the Age of Imperialism (early eighteenth century through the late
nineteenth century), and pressure from outside agencies such as the
Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property
have forced many museums to do some exhaustive vetting before acquiring
a piece of art, it is still a point of contention today with many museums
seeking “backdoor” deals to acquire new finds. Both museums and private
collectors need to ask themselves, what were the conditions—political,
economic, social—under which the piece was collected? By whom was this
work acquired, and for what purposes? Can one justify possessing it today,
and if not, what should happen to it? Even Fordham University once found
itself embroiled in legal wrangling over a funerary relic from Italy that was
being displayed in the Walsh library. A deal was reached where Walsh shared
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“ownership” of the piece with the piece being lent back and forth between
Walsh and its original home in the Republic of Italy.
By asking (and answering) these questions before acquisitions, one can
avoid demands for reparations of cultural relics by native countries whose
property was stolen, usually by force during colonization or wartime conflict.
The issue of repatriation will almost inevitably involve conflicting attitudes
— legal, moral and ethical. These affairs of repatriation often contain the
added incendiary ingredient of emotion; an important aspect that property
law must take into account. The law is doing more than just keeping a
physical object safe and assigning ownership. This type of property has
significant cultural/emotional value, as Vibeke Jensen, Director of the
UNESCO Office in New York, stated when commenting on the destruction
of 14 religious buildings in Timbuktu,“… this reflects the life of a
community, its history and its identity...and its preservation helps to rebuild
broken communities, re-establish identities, and link the past with the present
and future...in addition, the cultural property of any people contributes to the
cultural heritage of humankind.”292
The legal issues revolving around the ownership of cultural property is
still a burgeoning area and is continuously evolving. Cultural property law’s
groundwork was laid in 1954 at the Hague Convention on the Protection of
Cultural Property. The convention which usually revolved around discussion
of older laws of war, had to switch gears to respond to the Nazi’s new warfare
technique of intentionally stealing or destroying cultural property. The Nazi’s
looting campaign has been regarded as one of the “the most coherent attempt
by one group of people to loot material on a systematic basis and on a
breathtaking (…) scale.”293 The convention’s strong focus was on inclusivity:
they defined cultural property as any “movable or immovable property of
great importance to the cultural heritage of every people.”294
However, that overly simplistic definition intended to serve as the source
of clarification, has been the catalyst of confusion and controversy in regard
to who has custody of humanity's artifacts. Despite its controversy, the
definition set up the pillars of safeguarding artifacts by outlining that 'the
High Contracting Parties undertake to prepare in time of peace for the
safeguarding of cultural property situated within their own territory against
the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict, by taking such measures, as they
292

UNESCOPRESS, Re-building Cultural Heritage in Mali, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/singleview/news/re_building_cultural_heritage_in_mali/.
293
Kowalski, W.W. (2003), Claims for Works of Art and their Legal Nature, in: The
International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Ed.) Resolution of Cultural
Property Disputes. Papers emanating from the seventh PCA International Law Seminar.,
294
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The
Hague, 14 May 1954.
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consider appropriate.’295 However, many of the laws established post Hague
convention largely neglected two key aspects. Firstly, no concrete law preexisted in relation to the restitution of either illegally exported or stolen
cultural objects. Second, many of the laws laid out solutions to repatriation
that were confusing, unfair, unjust, and completely disregarded the pervasive
issue of holding and stealing stolen artifacts on the international market.
II. ZUCKERMAN V. METRO. MUSEUM OF ART
An ideal example of how blurred the lines can be in cultural property laws
is found with the following case. In January 2017, Laurel Zuckerman as
Ancillary Administratrix of the estate of Alice Leffmann (the “Leffmann
estate”), submitted a memorandum in opposition to the motion of the
Metropolitan Museum of Art (the “Museum” or “Defendant”) to dismiss the
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”). The Preliminary
statement contests that this is a dispute over the ownership of a masterwork
by Pablo Picasso entitled The Actor (L’Acteur) (the “Painting”), which is
currently on display as part of a permanent collection at the MOMA. Through
its motion, the Museum falsely depicts the 1938 sale of the painting as a runof-the-mill commercial transaction in which a wealthy individual sold a
painting in the open market at fair value to fund his international travels. This
transaction, however, did not occur in a normal place, at a normal time, nor
under normal circumstances.
Zuckerman alleges that the Picasso masterpiece was sold by his
descendant to fund the Leffman’s family’s escape from the Nazis. It was
during this dark period for Jews (especially German Jews) in Italy that Paul
Leffmann sold The Actor in 1938 under duress, for well below its value, in
order to finance his family’s escape from persecution. The Met Museum
acquired the piece in 1952 and Paul Leffman made the demand for the return
of the painting in 2010.296 That date proves crucial in the court’s decision,
stating that the United States Court of Appeals in Manhattan said Laurel
Zuckerman, the great-grandniece of Paul Leffmann, waited too long to
demand the painting's return.297
The decision read: "It is simply not plausible that the Leffmanns and their
heirs would not have been able to seek replevin — a legal term for an action

295

The Hague, op. cit, 3.
Cascone, Sarah (2018), “Was the Met’s Prized Picasso Sold Under Duress Because of
the Nazis? A New Appeal Revives an Eight-Year-Old Legal Battle,” (artnet),
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/nazi-restitution-case-picasso-actor-metropolitanmuseum-1325951.
297
Id.
296
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involving the return of property — of the painting prior to 2010.”298 The court
added that the HEAR Act, a commonly cited law in restitution cases allowing
heirs of victims of Nazi persecution to reclaim art, did not apply because of
the lapse in time.299 "This is not a case where the identity of the buyer was
unknown to the seller or the lost property was difficult to locate," Judge
Katzmann concluded.300 Although the court did recognize that the work was
sold under duress by her late relatives, due to the amount of time that had
elapsed Chief Judge Robert Katzmann decided it would be unfair for the art
museum to relinquish the Picasso masterpiece.301 If this decision employs a
time limit on when a claimant can regain the possession of the artwork, even
if the artwork in question was noted to be illegally acquired, renders that this
decision can be used to argue on behalf of almost all museums as their legal
right to retain the artwork since a vast majority of the artwork being argued
has been acquired 100s of years ago.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ZUCKERMAN V. METRO. MUSEUM OF ART
The decision ruled in this case has the potential to become a default siting
that would almost invariably side with that of the museum. With the decision
relying heavily upon the fact that the plaintiff was aware of the location for
an extended period of time and had ample opportunity to approach this issue
years ago, how would such a ruling fair with a piece that has been sitting in
a British museum for over 300 years? This precedent, if put into place, would
essentially translate that all museums can keep artifacts as long as the statute
of limitations has passed.
Employing this as a paradigm for all future cultural property cases is
reminiscent of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Regardless of the potential
“dicey” circumstances in which museums might have acquired possession of
the artifacts, if a “sufficient” amount of time has passed and the nation had
knowledge of the artifacts location but failed to reclaim the piece, then the
piece deserves to remain in the possession of the present “owner.” The one
aspect it does neglect however is the concept of human dignity. An artifact
does not necessarily possess qualities that deem it “human;” as discussed
prior, these objects' importance however can transcend their physical nature
and can potentially represent an entire race's cultural identity. By following
the maxim based on time alone one can clear up any confusion on ownership
and take a hard stance on the issue. However, it also poses an issue of
potentially violating one’s human dignity, an unethical practice.
298

Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, No. 18-634 at 15, (2d Cir. 2019).
Id, at 4.
300
Id, at 16.
301
Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 23.
299
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IV. THE CASE OF THE TOI MOKO FROM THE COLLECTION OF THE
NATIONAL MUSEUM OF ETHNOLOGY
Taking a look at an even more delicate museum piece that blends both art
and body, it is listed under inventory number RMV 360-5763.302 This
innocuous sequence of letters and numbers refers to the preserved head of a
Māori individual which was housed at the National Museum of Ethnology in
Leiden. The provenance of this specific head was unfortunately lost.
However, these tattooed and preserved Māori heads were and still are a highly
personal and sacred part of Māori culture.303 Even more so, the head is
considered to be the most sacred body part and the act of tattooing the head
further enhances this sacredness.304 The intricate patterning of facial moko
produced what can be likened to fingerprints: individuals were identifiable
by their moko, even after death.305 The heads of family members or
conquered enemies with moko were often preserved, a complex process that
involved the smoking of the head and drying it in the sun.306 The resulting
preserved skin-covered skull would still display the ornate distinct tattoos that
allowed identification of it as an individual and, thus, a revered deceased
person could remain a member of his community forever.307 Depending on
the circumstance, these Toi Moko would be used in religious ceremonies.308
There is no denying that the public has a deep fascination with death and a
desire to possess the exotic which has engendered both a licit and an illicit
market for human remains. In this specific case, the museum wrestled with
the pros and cons of returning such a rare piece and whether or not the Te
Papa (the national museum of New Zealand) qualified as a legitimate
stakeholder to claim the remains.309 They surmised three main reasons why
they thought the turnover would be unjustified. As one of the most senior
objects from the collection, the Toi Moko has “become part of a European
museum tradition, the preservation of which also should be recognized as a

302

Lubina, K. (2009). “Contested Cultural Property: the return of Nazi spoliated art and
human remains from public collections.” (Datawyse / Universitaire Pers Maastricht).
303
Yates, Donna (2013), “Toi Moko”, (Trafficking Culture).
304
Newell, Jenny and King, Jonathan (2006), ‘Human Remains from New Zealand:
Briefing note for Trustees’, (The British Museum).
305
Yates, Donna (2013), “Toi Moko”, (Trafficking Culture).
306
Mulholland, Malcom (2011), “Mokomokai are home where they belong,” (The Timaru
Herald).
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
Lubina, K. (2009). “Contested cultural property : the return of nazi spoliated art…” op
cite 392.
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highly serious responsibility (…).”310 Furthermore, a return of the Toi Moko
would harm the integrity of the collection and thereby would result in a
“falsification of the history.”311 Finally, and the most pressing issue was the
potential loss of future research on the Toi Moko.312 This reason alone was
considered far more important than the loss of the object for exhibition
purposes.
Even with those legitimate reasons the SVCN Ethnological Ethics
Committee clearly provided that the Toi Moko should be returned
unconditionally or remain permanently in the National Museum of
Anthology -- it would be unacceptable to have such a contentious piece
systematically loaned to its “rightful owner” and then returned to the
museum.313 The National Museum of Ethnology, however, did express “it
would be extremely helpful support for Te Papa’s repatriation policy. Such a
document would be an elegant companion to the New Zealand Government’s
mandate.”314 While it does not appear from the available documentation
whether an explicit statement by one of the Māori was ever presented, or
which other developments might have triggered the decision, by August 2005
the National Museum of Ethnology was ready to return the Toi Moko.315 By
letter, the director of the National Museum of Ethnology asked the Secretary
of Culture to mandate the return of the Māori head to the Te Papa.316 The
Minister of Culture gave the mandate to the director of the museum, Steven
Engelsman, to transfer the property of the Toi Moko.317 On November 9th,
2005 the head was returned to representatives of the Te Papa during a small
ceremony attended by curators, scientists, academics, and journalists.318
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TOI MOKO’S RETURN TO TE PAPA
Unlike Zuckerman vs. Metro Museum of Art, the duel was between two
museums and was never brought to court. However, the murkiness of legality
once again concerned the question of ownership between two parties. The
310

Id, 394.
Id.
312
Id.
313
National Maritime Museum Act 1934 (c.43), London: The Stationery Office, s 2(3)(b).
314
1 Engelsman, S., (2004), Letter to Mrs. Catherine Nesus - Repatriation Project Leader of
the Te Papa.
315
Lubina, K. (2009). “Contested cultural property : the return of nazi spoliated art…” op
cite 400.
316
Engelsman, S., (2004), Letter to Mrs. Catherine Nesus - Repatriation Project Leader of
the Te Papa.
317
Lubina, K. (2009). “Contested Cultural Property: The Return of Nazi Spoliated Art…”
op cit 402.
318
Kaam, A.v.,(2005), “ Hoofd van Maori gaat terug,” (Leidsch Dagblad,).
311
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National Museum of Ethnology’s decision to return the piece following the
SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee advice was ultimately born out of their
own decision — not any legal framework forcing them. Both sides presented
valid arguments on why they should be the final resting place for this piece,
and the ultimate return reflected many of the tenets of utilitarianism. Citing
the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (CHP Act), which is reminiscent of
the German Cultural Property Protection Act, aims to protect cultural objects
deemed irreplaceable and indispensable and of national relevance in private
collections, as well as public collections.319 An object is irreplaceable if there
are no similar objects present in the Netherlands.320 In the case of the Toi
Moko they determined it might have been irreplaceable, but it did not pass
muster on being indispensable, they found it lacked any symbolic function.321
Its unknown provenance therefore could not serve as memory of historically
important persons or events.322
The Toi Moko, however, might have a “linking function.” This notion of
indispensability is described as the “functioning of an object or collection as
an essential element in a development that is of great importance for the
exercise of scholarly work, including cultural science studies.”323 While one
could clearly argue that the Toi Moko is extremely relevant for scientific
research and cultural science studies it seems unlikely that the object is of
such great importance that it fulfills a ‘linking function’ and is thus
indispensable. However, that's looking at solely one object. If the courts are
to apply the same rationale that certain sole pieces serve as the key element
that link together the importance of the entire collection, then every piece in
the Royale Collection of Rarities falls under that premise because many
would claim the greater importance of the collection is the sum of all its
pieces. Yet a different matter is the status of the Toi Moko as part of the
greater collection. This collection clearly satisfies the criteria of

319
Gesetz zum Schutz deutschen Kulturgutes gegen Abwanderung in der Fassung der
Bekanntmachung vom 8 Juli 1999 (BGBl. I S. 1754). Another source of inspiration is the
Flemish Topstukkendecreet (Decreet van 24 januari 2003 “houdende bescherming van het
roerend cultureel erfgoed van uitzonderlijk belang“ (B.S. 14 maart 2003). According to
Art. 5 § 1 the decree applies also to objects and collections owned by public authorities.
Cf.: Draye, A.M., 2007, p. 390.
320
Art. 2(2) CHP Act.
321
Lubina, K. (2009). “Contested cultural property: the return of nazi spoliated art…” op
cite 402.
322
Art. 2(3)(a) CHP Act.
323
Art. 2(3)(b) CHP Act. See also: Memorie van Toelichting, 27812, nr. 3, p. 8 para. 7. An
example of an object listed for its “linking function” is a stone sculpture of a standing
triumphing Jesus Christ. The sculpture dates from the Roman period and is one of very few
similar sculptures that are present in the Netherlands. The sculpture is thus important for
the studying of stone sculptures in the Maas area. Cf.: Raad voor Cultuur, 2001.
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irreplaceability and indispensability.324 Not only can the collection serve as
memory of King William (1772-1843) as founder of the collection, which
suggests a symbolic function, even more relevant is the collection’s “linking
function” and “reference function”: the foundation of the collection is typical
for the emergence of public collections out of private collections at the end
of the 18th century within Europe.
While the loss of the Toi Moko cannot diminish the meaning and
significance of the collection as a whole, it is important to note that the loss
for the collection would be felt. To soften the blow, so to speak, the museum
requested from Te Papa precise documentation to compensate for its loss for
the Royal Collection of Rarities and thus to further ensure the collection’s
integrity.325 Looking at this through a Utilitarian lens, a moral theory
propagated — that everyone’s purpose is to make life better by increasing the
amount of good things (such as pleasure and happiness) in the world and
decreasing the amount of bad things (such as pain and unhappiness).326 By
the Museum of Ethnology sacrificing the Toi Moko back to the Te Papa it
can be said that it did suffer pain, but returning the sacred ceremonial head to
an institution that qualified as a more appropriate stakeholder and place of
origin the overall happiness of the Maori race was increased. This case can
be used as a good model of reparation on multiple fronts; not only did the Te
Papa provide a symbolic relief to the Museum of Ethnology, but the Toi
Moko was also returned to another well respected institution where the head
would be preserved safely and looked after.
One of the main core principles that comes under scrutiny in restitution of
human remains cases is proof of being the appropriate stakeholder. What
happens in a case that deals with something as sensitive as human remains,
and an appropriate stakeholder who doesn't have the proper faculties to care
for a precious potentially “irreplaceable and indispensable?” A potential
solution that should always be employed is following the two principles
established in the above case. The first one being, “Any decision-making
process involving human remains should take due account of the views of all
stakeholders, including those from the country of origin.”327 Even if the
country of origin claiming the human remains is deemed appropriate, the
holding institution does not sacrifice its autonomy in the decision-making
process completely. The second tenet being, “the holding institution must
share with the claimant the criteria that were decisive in the decision-making
324

Art. 2(3)(a) CHP Act.
Lubina, K. (2009). “Contested cultural property: the return of nazi spoliated art…” op
cit. 402.
326
Mill, John Stuart (1861), Utilitarianism.
327
Lubina, K. (2009). “Contested cultural property: the return of nazi spoliated art…” op
cit. 402.
325
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process.”328 Once again applying this makes sure that both parties’ authority
is recognized appropriately in the claim. Implementing these two principles
beyond cultural property in terms of human rains can potentially ensure a
more Utilitarian approach to repatriation. This approach ensures that the
appropriate stakeholder wins while also preventing the museum in possession
of the item from being defamed, and the integrity of the collection is not
harmed. This utilitarian approach might even encourage more institutions to
forgo certain objects seeing that they retain some say and are not defamed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite these deliberations of ownership having the potential to be highly
influenced by moral, ethical and emotional factors, the absolute legal
decisions must be made via a series of existing and to-be established laws and
criteria that although take into account the sensitive nature of the arguments,
is able to defer to a clear and well defined series of principles. As we can see
the laws already established can be applied in both effective and nefarious
ways due to their wide range of interpretation and implementation afforded.
Creating a third impartial council reminiscent of the SVCN Ethnological
Ethics Committee that operates on international level is crucial. Looking at
these cases through the lens of Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Mill’s
Utilitarianism, one comes to the conclusion that while many of these
“cosmopolitan” museums still house “grey area” exhibits (depriving some
rightful nations of their nation’s history), we can’t forgo the other perspective
in these matters completely. Favoring one side and maligning the other can
only perpetuate this cycle further and drive many deals further
“underground.”
***

328
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